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CLEAR AS MUD: CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
WITH CLEAR AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT 
 
C. ASHLEY SAFERIGHT* 
ABSTRACT 
Rape and sexual assault laws and policies have shifted significantly in recent years, 
including the introduction of affirmative consent. Unfortunately, both proponents and 
critics tend to confuse the issues and falsely equate affirmative consent as a substantive 
social standard versus a procedural standard for adjudication and punishment. 
Although affirmative consent generally does not represent a significant change in 
consent law in the United States, statutes and policies requiring a further requirement 
that affirmative consent be clear and unambiguous (“clear affirmative consent”) are 
problematic and raise constitutional concerns. When clear affirmative consent policies 
are used as an adjudicative standard, they increase the dangers of policing sex and may 
punish even consenting adults. Further, clear affirmative consent policies are 
unconstitutional because: they are unconstitutionally overbroad; they violate 
substantive due process rights as unconstitutionally vague; and they violate the 
constitutional guarantee of free speech and the privacy rights of consenting adults.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Yeah, that’s her. With the gold. I better use some Tic Tacs just in case I 
start kissing her. You know, I'm automatically attracted to beautiful–I just 
start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t even wait. And when 
you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything. . . Grab ’em by the 
pussy. You can do anything.”1  
 
This oft-quoted and much maligned statement of now President Donald Trump is 
a stark illustration of “rape culture.”2 Sexual assaults are a significant problem across 
the United States, and in particular on college campuses.3 According to a 2015 study 
conducted by the Association of American Universities, more than twenty-seven 
percent of female college seniors reported having experienced some form of sexual 
assault while enrolled in college.4 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(“CDC”) reports that 18.3% of adult women have been raped, with 37.4% of female 
rape victims being first raped between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four.5 With 
                                                          
* C. Ashley Saferight – J.D. expected, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, May 2019. I would 
like to extend unending gratitude for those who provided guidance and feedback throughout the 
research and drafting process, including Stephen R. Lazarus, Kevin F. O’Neill, and the editors 
of the Cleveland State Law Review. I would also like to give special thanks to my fiancé, 
Michael Curry, for his unwavering support and encouragement.  
 1  Mark Makela, Transcript: Donald Trump’s Taped Comments About Women, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcript.html.  
 2  Emanuella Grinberg, Trump’s ‘Locker Room Talk’ Stirs Real Talk About Sexual 
Violence, CNN (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/11/health/trump-locker-room-
talk-reaction/index.html. 
 3  Claude Mellins et al., Sexual Assault Incidents Among College Undergraduates: 
Prevalence and Factors Associated with Risk, NAT’L CTR FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (Nov. 8, 
2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5695602/. 
 4  AAU Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and Sexual Misconduct, ASS’N OF AM. U. (Sept. 
3, 2015), https://www.aau.edu/key-issues/aau-climate-survey-sexual-assault-and-sexual-
misconduct-2015. 
 5  Statistics on Sexual Violence in the United States, TESTIMONY PROJECT, 
https://www.thetestimonyprojectdc.com/statistics-on-sexual-violence-in-the-united-states/ 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2019); Michele C. Black et al., National Intimate Partner and Sexual 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss3/8
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statistics like these, it is no surprise that rape and sexual assault have garnered 
increasing scrutiny and media attention, particularly on college campuses. 
But the cautionary tale of the young woman, walking alone at night, being pulled 
into the bushes and raped by a stranger is not the reality for the vast majority of these 
women. More than half of all female rape victims report that the perpetrator was an 
intimate partner.6  
 From September 2014 until graduation in May 2015, Columbia University student 
Emma Sulkowicz carried a fifty-pound dorm mattress around campus to protest 
Columbia’s failure to hold her alleged rapist responsible for sexual misconduct, 
stemming from what started as a consensual encounter.7 Arguably, this act of 
performance-art, titled “Mattress Performance (Carry That Weight),” was the catalyst 
that spurred sexual assault discussions, protests, and the adoption of stringent new 
policies designed to improve campus response to sexual assault.8 
Rape and sexual assault law has evolved significantly over time: from the common 
law recognition of rape as a property crime against a woman’s husband or father;9 to 
requiring physical force from the perpetrator and utmost physical resistance from the 
victim;10 to eventual passage of shield laws not allowing a victim’s sexual history to 
be used against her in court;11 and finally, to recognition of marital, date, and 
acquaintance rape as crimes.12 These changes have signified an inexorable and 
inevitable march towards affirmative consent as the desirable and necessary standard 
to keep women safe.13  
                                                          
Violence Survey: 2010 Summary Report, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, (Nov. 
2011), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf. 
 6  National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, supra note 5. 
 7  Kate Taylor, Mattress Protest at Columbia University Continues into Graduation Event, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/nyregion/mattress-protest-
at-columbia-university-continues-into-graduation-event.html.  
 8  Jeannie Suk Gerson, College Students Go to Court Over Sexual Assault, NEW YORKER 
(Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/colleges-go-to-court-over-
sexual-assault. 
 9  Ethan Bronner, A Candidate’s Stumble on a Distressing Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/us/definition-of-rape-is-shifting-rapidly.html 
(stating that marriage was a “transfer of property from father to husband and if someone 
deflowered the virgin, that removed the property rights of the father. Rape was about stealing 
his property.”). 
 10  People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 117 (Cal. 1986).  
 11  The Federal Rules of Evidence were amended October 28, 1978 to include the first 
version of a rape shield law. See FED. R. EVID. 412.  
 12  Lily Rothman, When Spousal Rape First Became a Crime in the U.S., TIME (July 28, 
2015), http://time.com/3975175/spousal-rape-case-history/.  
 13  Jake New, The ‘Yes Means Yes' World, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 17, 2014), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/17/colleges-across-country-adopting-
affirmative-consent-sexual-assault-policies (discussing how over 800 colleges in the United 
States have adopted affirmative consent policies).   
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Affirmative consent has become exceptionally polarized—it is either held up as 
the gold standard or vilified as a gross overreach of government.14 There seems to be 
significant confusion as to the actual definition of affirmative consent.15 Is it enough 
to say that “only yes means yes?”16 Does affirmative consent require a verbal 
statement of consent?17 In addition, both proponents and opponents of affirmative 
consent lack clarity in their support for, or objection to, affirmative consent as a 
substantive rule versus a procedural standard for adjudication.18 
 This Note will argue that although affirmative consent generally does not 
represent a significant change in consent law in the United States, statutes and policies 
requiring a further requirement that affirmative consent be clear and unambiguous 
(“clear affirmative consent”) are problematic and raise constitutional concerns. This 
Note will focus exclusively on clear affirmative consent policies and will argue that 
such policies increase the dangers of policing sex and may punish even consenting 
adults. Further, clear affirmative consent policies are unconstitutional for several 
reasons: they are unconstitutionally overbroad; they violate First Amendment free 
speech rights; they violate substantive due process rights as unconstitutionally vague; 
and they violate the constitutional right to privacy.  
Part II-A of this Note will provide a historical overview of rape and sexual assault 
law and policy in the United States, will comprehensively discuss the confusion 
surrounding definitions of affirmative consent, and will explain how clear affirmative 
consent policies differ from general affirmative consent policies. Part II-A will also 
clarify the distinctions between affirmative consent as a substantive social rule (how 
individuals are expected to act) and clear affirmative consent as the procedural 
standard (adjudication and punishment). This Note will argue that although 
affirmative consent is an appropriate and desirable social rule, as an adjudicative 
standard, clear affirmative consent policies do not effectively protect victims of rape 
and sexual assault, and they also raise constitutional concerns, as they violate rights 
of consenting adults. Using an adjudicative standard that is fundamentally flawed and 
intrudes upon the rights of law-abiding citizens significantly harms the position of 
victim’s rights advocates. Such a flawed standard provides ammunition for critics to 
dismiss the claims of women more easily and further perpetuates the myth of vast 
numbers of false rape reports.  
                                                          
 14  Compare Michael Fein, Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOSTON GLOBE 
(Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-
harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html (opposing Harvard’s 
affirmative consent standard), with Wendy Murphy, Harvard Gets it Right on Sexual Assault, 
BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/12/02/harvard-gets-
right-sexual-assault/mmM8hZRndrtP9MAPXwOvtM/story.html (supporting Harvard’s 
affirmative consent standard). 
 15  Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Unpacking Affirmative Consent: Not As Great As You Hope, Not 
As Bad As You Fear, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 57, 58 (2016) (“The phrase ‘yes means yes’ is a 
slogan (perhaps a good one), not an actual legal standard or an explanation of a legal standard. 
Affirmative consent does not require ‘express verbal agreement.’”). 
 16  Id. at 65–66. 
 17  Id. at 66. 
 18  Id. at 84. 
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Part II will also include a brief discussion of Title IX’s role in the campus sexual 
assault adjudication process (II-B) and introductions to the constitutional guarantees 
of free speech (II-C) and privacy (II-D). Part III-A will discuss the dangers presented 
by clear affirmative consent policies as related to policing sex and Part III-B will 
provide a cautionary tale of a university student who was expelled from school due to 
an alleged sexual assault, despite both parties stating that the sexual encounter was 
consensual.   
Part IV-A will argue that clear affirmative consent policies are unconstitutionally 
overbroad. Part IV-B will make a case that clear affirmative consent policies violate 
free speech and will examine expressive conduct as speech, the compelled speech 
doctrine, and prohibited government restriction of speech. Part IV-C will examine 
substantive due process and will argue that clear affirmative consent policies are 
unconstitutionally vague. Finally, Part IV-C will investigate the dangers of clear 
affirmative consent as the standard in criminal prosecutions and will contend that these 
policies violate the constitutional right to privacy as part of the liberty guarantee of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Affirmative Consent: What is it and how did we get here? 
To fully understand the discourse and controversy surrounding the affirmative 
consent standard, it is important to identify common misconceptions about what 
affirmative consent is and to discuss how the history and evolution of rape and sexual 
assault law in the United States has shaped the conversations about consent that are 
ongoing today.  
1. History and Evolution of Rape and Sexual Assault Law 
Upon examining the history of rape and sexual assault law, it becomes 
immediately clear that it is inextricable from sexism and misogyny19 and is  
laden with historical baggage and political half-steps.”20 The state of modern rape law 
has been described as “the product of a set of imperfect compromises, based upon 
historical contingencies,” with competing political forces shaping the slow evolution 
of consent.21 
Even into the 1970s, the common law definition of rape was largely designed to 
protect male interests, with little regard for victims’ rights.22 The traditional common 
law elements of rape were: “(1) sexual intercourse; (2) between a man and a woman 
who is not his wife; (3) achieved by force or threat of severe bodily harm; and (4) 
without her consent.”23 Courts routinely interpreted the non-consent and force 
requirements to require that a woman’s resistance rise to the level of a “valiant struggle 
                                                          
 19  People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 118 (Cal. 1986) (discussing the history of rape law, and 
emphasizing that the resistance requirement stemmed from a distrust of women); Anne M. 
Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 5, 13 (Feb. 1998).  
 20  Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 5 (2015).  
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. at 15.  
 23  Id. 
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to uphold her honor” and must be “to the utmost limit of her power.”24 Courts held 
that even when threatened with specific violence, if a victim eventually stopped 
resisting, such “voluntary” submission to a rapist would amount to consent.25 In 
addition, courts were permitted to consider a victim’s past sexual behavior—with the 
defendant or others—to question her credibility as a witness and prove consent.26 Most 
jurisdictions required corroboration because a woman’s testimony was considered to 
be inherently untrustworthy, and therefore, insufficient to show non-consent by 
itself.27  
The feminist movement significantly influenced rape law reform.28 Michigan 
became the first state to substantially reform rape law in the mid-1970s.29 Over the 
next twenty years, rape law reform took hold, leading to major changes, including: 
abandoning of gender-specific terms in favor of gender-neutrality; criminalizing all 
types of penetration, rather than just vaginal intercourse; and criminalizing marital 
rape.30 Nevertheless, courts continued to reverse rape convictions where the 
complainant exhibited little or no resistance, even where consent was objectively 
absent.31 Even a verbal “no” was not enough in many circumstances32 and it was not 
until much later that the idea of “no means no” even took hold.33  
Only recently have jurisdictions abandoned the requirement of force.34 In 1991, 
the Senate Report for the Violence Against Women Act of 1991 acknowledged the 
“subtle prejudices” against rape victims in the legal system and that rape prosecutions 
                                                          
 24  People v. Hughes, 343 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). 
 25  Yung, supra note 20, at 15. 
 26  People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 117 (Cal. 1986); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 47–49 
(1987). 
 27  Barnes, 721 P.2d at 117–18 (“The requirement that a woman resist her attacker appears 
to have been grounded in the basic distrust with which courts and commentators traditionally 
viewed a woman's testimony regarding sexual assault. According to the 17th century writings 
of Lord Matthew Hale, in order to be deemed a credible witness, a woman had to be of good 
fame, disclose the injury immediately, suffer signs of injury and cry out for help.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 28  Jason M. Price, Sex, Lies, and Rape Shield Statutes: The Constitutionality of Interpreting 
Rape Shield Statutes to Exclude Evidence Relating to the Victim's Motive to Fabricate, 18 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 550–51 (1996). 
 29  Yung, supra note 20, at 15; Price, supra note 28, at 551. 
 30  Yung, supra note 20, at 15, 20. 
 31  United States v. Townsend, 34 M.J. 882, 885 (C.G.C.M.R. 1992) (overturning a military 
rape conviction when victim did not manifest resistance, but “froze” when her verbal protests 
went unheeded); People v. Bales, 169 P.2d 262, 265 (Cal. App. 1946) (reversing rape conviction 
where evidence showed no real resistance from complainant). 
 32  Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1164 (1994) (finding that woman was not 
raped despite repeated verbal “no’s” when victim did not approach the locked door to attempt 
to unlock it, and defendant did not use force or threats). 
 33  Joel Emlen, A Critical Exercise in Effectuating “No Means No” Rape Law, 29 VT. L. 
REV. 215, 215, 220 (2004). 
 34  Yung, supra note 20, at 16; see State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992). 
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“put the victim—not the attacker—on trial.”35 Until 2012, even the FBI’s Uniform 
Crime Reporting Program still used a definition of “forcible rape” that originated in 
the 1920s: “the carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly and against her will,” which 
only includes forcible penetration of a vagina by a penis, excluding oral or anal 
penetration, and excluding vaginal penetration with an object other than a penis.36 The 
new FBI definition states “penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus 
with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, 
without the consent of the victim.”37 
Historically, defendants in rape or sexual assault proceedings were permitted to 
introduce evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual experiences.38 Rape shield laws 
were not widely adopted until the late 1970s, and in 1978, Congress enacted Federal 
Rule of Evidence 412, making the sexual history of a victim inadmissible under most 
circumstances.39 The historical precedent was steeped in mistrust of women and a 
social desire to police the behaviors of women feared to be promiscuous.40 This led to 
decades of rape law that subjugated the sexual autonomy and bodily integrity of 
women to the desires of sexually aggressive men. It is no surprise that modern 
reformists continued to seek change that would further transform the paradigm.41  
2. Affirmative Consent: Yes Means Yes? Not Exactly 
The historical shift of rape and sexual assault law, coupled with the contemporary 
climate demanding changes in the prevention and handling of ever-increasing 
numbers of sexual assaults, have led to the current highly charged debate. 
Unsurprisingly, affirmative consent emerged as a desirable standard.42  
Affirmative consent, at its most basic level, simply requires that “some signal of 
agreement must be sent by each party to a sexual encounter.”43 In other words, 
affirmative consent simply requires some expression of willingness to participate in a 
sexual encounter, rather than depending on the absence of an expression of 
unwillingness. Commentators have argued that this represents at most a modest 
clarification of what is already the modern practice in rape and sexual assault cases in 
most U.S. jurisdictions.44 Affirmative consent is most notoriously described as “only 
                                                          
 35  S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 50, 57 (1991).  
 36  Charlie Savage, U.S. to Expand Its Definition of Rape in Statistics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/us/politics/federal-crime-statistics-to-expand-
rape-definition.html.  
 37  Id. 
 38  Price, supra note 28, at 550.  
 39  Id. at 551.  
 40  See id. at 550 (“One of the reasons [for allowing inquiry into a victim’s sexual history] . 
. . was that unchaste women were considered dishonest. Further, supporters of the common-law 
doctrine . . . justified the doctrine by stating that a woman’s unchaste character is probative on 
the issue of whether the woman consented to sex on a particular occasion.”). 
 41  Stephen Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of Rape, 35 LAW & INEQ. 335, 335–36 (2017). 
 42  See New, supra note 13.  
 43  Witmer-Rich, supra note 15, at 88. 
 44  Id. 
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yes means yes,”45 but this slogan severely oversimplifies the concept, and is in fact 
inaccurate as the definition of the legal standard required of affirmative consent.46 
Generally, affirmative consent does not require express verbal permission,47 meaning 
many things besides “yes,” can mean “yes.”  
While most U.S. jurisdictions do not use affirmative consent to describe the legal 
consent element, New Jersey, Illinois, Washington, and Wisconsin all incorporate 
language requiring “freely given agreement” for sexual contact.48 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court stated that defendants must believe that “the alleged victim had freely 
given affirmative permission” and that “[s]uch permission can be indicated either 
through words or through actions that, when viewed in the light of all the surrounding 
circumstances, would demonstrate to a reasonable person affirmative and freely-given 
authorization for the specific act of sexual penetration.”49 Although the court used the 
term “affirmative permission” and clearly articulated permission could be given 
through words or actions, it did not further define or clarify the standard.  
While affirmative consent as the standard in the criminal context is relatively rare, 
it has taken a firm hold on college and university campuses. The National Center for 
Higher Education Risk Management reported that as of 2014, over 800 colleges have 
adopted an affirmative consent standard.50 The state legislatures in California and New 
York even codified the affirmative consent standard, requiring that an affirmative 
consent definition be adopted for all state university sexual assault policies.51 
California’s definition is:  
 
“Affirmative consent” means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary 
agreement to engage in sexual activity. It is the responsibility of each 
                                                          
 45  Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes Means Yes”: An Essay on University Policies Regarding 
Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 389–90 (2015). 
 46  Witmer-Rich, supra note 15, at 66.  
 47  Id.  
 48  Id. at 61 n.13 (citing State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992) (“Such 
permission can be indicated either through words or through actions that, when viewed in the 
light of all the surrounding circumstances, would demonstrate to a reasonable person affirmative 
and freely-given authorization for the specific act of sexual penetration.”). See, e.g., 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.70(a) (2012) (“‘Consent’ means a freely given agreement to the act of 
sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or 
submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force by the accused shall 
not constitute consent.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(7) (2007) (“‘Consent’ means that at 
the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact there are actual words or conduct 
indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”). 
 49  State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992). 
 50  Wendy Adele Humphrey, “Let's Talk About Sex”: Legislating and Educating on the 
Affirmative Consent Standard, 50 U.S.F.L. REV. 35, 57 (2016). 
 51  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(1) (West 2016); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6441 (McKinney 2015) 
(“Every institution shall adopt the following definition of affirmative consent as part of its code 
of conduct: ‘Affirmative consent is a knowing, voluntary, and mutual decision among all 
participants to engage in sexual activity. Consent can be given by words or actions, as long as 
those words or actions create clear permission regarding willingness to engage in the sexual 
activity. Silence or lack of resistance, in and of itself, does not demonstrate consent.’”). 
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person involved in the sexual activity to ensure that he or she has the 
affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the sexual activity. 
Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence mean 
consent. Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity 
and can be revoked at any time. The existence of a dating relationship 
between the persons involved, or the fact of past sexual relations between 
them, should never by itself be assumed to be an indicator of consent.52 
 
Even in states without such legislation, universities around the country are adopting 
similar definitions for their sexual assault policies.53  
3. Different Standards: Affirmative Consent and Clear Affirmative Consent 
Affirmative consent does not mean clear, unambiguous consent.54 This is perhaps 
the most common misconception about affirmative consent and is easily observed in 
commentary from both critics and supporters of the affirmative consent standard.55 
Even a survey of dictionary definitions does not support interpreting affirmative to 
mean unambiguous.56 While affirmative consent by itself does not impose the 
unambiguous standard, there are a small but growing number of policies that also 
include an unambiguous or clear consent standard as part of their affirmative consent 
definitions.57 This distinction has “gone largely unnoticed in the literature” and 
“represents a major change to existing sexual assault law or university policies. Simply 
requiring affirmative consent does not.”58  
For example, in Columbia University’s 2017 Gender-Based Misconduct 
Handbook, students are advised that “[c]onsensual sexual conduct requires affirmative 
consent. New York State law defines affirmative consent as a knowing, voluntary and 
mutual decision among all participants involved.”59 The policy further explains that 
consent may be given “by words or actions, as long as those words or actions clearly 
communicate willingness to engage in the sexual activity. It is important not to make 
assumptions about consent. If there is confusion or ambiguity, participants need to 
stop sexual activity and talk about each person’s willingness to continue.”60 
                                                          
 52  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(1) (West 2016). 
 53  Witmer-Rich, supra note 15, at 63.  
 54  Id. at 68.  
 55  See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
1453, 1476 (2014); Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. 221, 263–64 (2015). 
 56  Witmer-Rich, supra note 15, at 68.  
 57  Id. at 69. 
 58  Id. at 68. 
 59  GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR STUDENTS, COLUM. U. 4 
(Aug. 24, 2018), 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/studentconduct/documents/GBMPolicyandProceduresforStudent
s.pdf.  
 60  Id. at 9.  
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The difficulty in interpreting Columbia’s policy is that the initial language defining 
affirmative consent does not contain a requirement that consent be unambiguous. 
However, in a later, clarifying sentence, the policy adds language requiring that one’s 
words or actions “clearly communicate willingness.”61 This creates confusion when 
interpreting this statute, as the later sentence seems designed to clarify the first 
sentence, but in reality, it instead adds an additional standard that is substantially 
different than affirmative consent.62 This additional requirement of clear, 
unambiguous consent creates both social and constitutional concerns.63 
4. Substantive Rule vs. Procedural Rule 
One aspect of affirmative consent policies that creates confusion and disagreement 
is the standard as it relates to substantive rules (how people should behave) versus 
how it relates to procedural rules (how violations are adjudicated).64 Affirmative 
consent as a substantive rule is designed to prevent assumptions about consent and to 
encourage increased communication of all parties to a sexual encounter.65 It seems 
uncontroversial that these are positive goals, and if affirmative consent can help realize 
them, it should be adopted as the substantive standard and immediately incorporated 
into discussions about sex education and sexual assault prevention.  
However, affirmative consent also carries with it a procedural and adjudicative 
aspect. As a procedural rule, the affirmative consent standard includes significant 
deficiencies, and it simply does not alleviate the current procedural difficulties faced 
by university administrative hearing boards or courts using non-affirmative definitions 
of consent. Adjudicative bodies—either courts in criminal proceedings, or university 
disciplinary committees for campus incidents—play two main roles: (1) fact-finding, 
and (2) interpretation of the facts to determine if consent was given. The first role, 
fact-finding, is often considered the “he said, she said” portion of the process.66 
Affirmative consent fails to ease the difficulty of this process when adjudicators must 
consider evidence from both sides and determine which version of the story is most 
credible.67 Affirmative consent comes into play in the second role: interpretation of 
the facts to determine if consent was given.68 Interpreting the often imprecise 
communication between parties to a sexual encounter often represents the most 
difficult task for adjudicators of sexual assault cases.69 Unfortunately, requiring some 
                                                          
 61  Id. 
 62  Witmer-Rich, supra note 15, at 65. 
 63  See discussion infra Parts III–IV.  
 64  Witmer-Rich, supra note 15, at 59 (“[T]he concept of affirmative consent carries with it 
a cluster of both substantive rules (related to the definition of consent) and procedural rules 
(related to how criminal prosecutions or university adjudications should be conducted).”). 
 65  Id. at 65.  
 66  Id. at 86. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. at 86–87. 
 69  Id. at 87. 
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affirmative signal of consent will not solve this already difficult problem.70 
Furthermore, because definitions are often unclear as to what behavior is sufficient to 
constitute affirmative consent, the standard is likely to be applied inconsistently, 
potentially resulting in both over and under punishment.  
The most widely used definitions of affirmative consent do not specifically require 
express verbal permission (as permission may also be granted through actions), nor 
do they require that permission be clear or unambiguous.71 With these kinds of 
definitions, there is unlikely to be a constitutional violation because there is no 
significant alteration of currently used consent definitions interpreted in the criminal 
context almost uniformly throughout the United States. However, policies that use 
affirmative consent as an adjudicative standard that require clear, unambiguous 
affirmative consent are unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Such policies also 
violate the First Amendment’s right to free speech, as well as the constitutional right 
to privacy.  
B. The Role of Title IX in the Affirmative Consent Debate 
Title IX requires universities to respond to sexual assault on campus to protect 
student victim’s educational interests and is therefore, a significant driving factor in 
the adoption of affirmative consent standards.72 Title IX of the Educational 
Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination in education programs or activities 
that receive federal funding, including public colleges and universities.73 Section 1681 
states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”74 Sexual 
harassment, including sexual violence, is considered sex discrimination under Title 
IX. Title IX defines sexual harassment as: “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature,” 
and can include “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”75 If the behavior is serious 
enough to limit a victim’s ability to participate in, or benefit from, the school’s 
program, it triggers a university’s duty to act.76 Title IX provides a private right of 
                                                          
 70  Id.  
 71  Id. at 88. 
 72  Id. at 61. 
 73  20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 74  Id. at § 1681(a). 
 75  OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: 
Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties (2001) 
[hereinafter 2001 Guidance].  
 76  Id. at 5. 
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action77 and is enforced by the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights 
(“OCR”) and the court system.78  
In 1981, administrative guidance first prohibited employee-student harassment as 
sex discrimination under Title IX.79 The Supreme Court expanded the private right of 
action to allow money damages in teacher-student harassment cases, when (1) an 
official with authority to address the situation has actual knowledge, and (2) the 
official is “deliberately indifferent” in the response.80 By 2000, both OCR and the 
Supreme Court expanded the definition to include student to student harassment in 
higher education,81 stating that: 
 
Sexual harassment of a student can deny or limit, on the basis of sex, the 
student’s ability to participate in or to receive benefits, services, or 
opportunities in the school’s program. Sexual harassment of students is, 
therefore, a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX under the 
circumstances described in this guidance.82 
 
Title IX prohibits both quid pro quo harassment (usually teacher-to-student) and 
hostile environment harassment, which can be either teacher-to-student, or student-to-
student.83 Title IX protects a student’s private interest in his or her education, but 
focuses on accusers of sexual assault, rather than accused students.84 
To protect a student victim’s education interests, Title IX requires that universities 
respond to allegations of sexual assaults on campus. Under OCR's standards, a school 
is in violation of Title IX when: (1) a responsible school official knew of or reasonably 
should have known of harassment; and (2) the school failed to respond promptly and 
effectively to eliminate the hostile environment and prevent its recurrence; or, (3) the 
accused student’s conduct was unwanted and sufficiently serious to deny or limit the 
harassed student’s ability to participate in an educational program or benefit.85 OCR 
specifically stated that its standard for a violation is broader than the courts’ 
                                                          
 77  Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009) (“[Title IX’s] only 
express enforcement mechanism, § 1682, is an administrative procedure resulting in the 
withdrawal of federal funding from institutions that are not in compliance. In addition, this 
Court has recognized an implied private right of action . . . [for which] both injunctive relief 
and damages are available.”). 
 78  Holly Hogan, The Real Choice in a Perceived “Catch-22”: Providing Fairness to Both 
the Accused and Complaining Students in College Sexual Assault Disciplinary Proceedings, 38 
J.L. & EDUC. 277, 280 (2009). 
 79  OCR Policy Memorandum from Antonio J. Califa, Dir. of Litig., Enf’t, & Policy Serv., 
to Reg’l Civil Rights Dirs. (Aug. 31, 1981). 
 80  Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998). 
 81  Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual 
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 51 (2013).  
 82  2001 Guidance, supra note 75, at 2. 
 83  Id. at 5.  
 84  Hogan, supra note 78, at 280. 
 85  2001 Guidance, supra note 75, at 12–13. 
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definition.86 Therefore, colleges and universities must take reports of sexual assault 
and sexual harassment seriously, and work to protect students from the academic 
barriers erected by sex discrimination. This focus on protection of victims of sexual 
assault played a key role in the adoption of affirmative consent standards on campuses 
across the nation, as affirmative consent is widely seen as more protective. 
C. First Amendment: Free Speech 
Perhaps one of the most lauded and fundamental rights afforded by the United 
States Constitution is the right to free speech. The First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.”87 While the text provides no limiting language or modifiers, it is well-settled 
that the right to free speech is not absolute.88 In Roth v. United States, Justice Brennan 
stated “[i]n light of history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First 
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance.”89 Litigation involving the 
constitutional question of free speech asks “whether the First Amendment allows 
public regulation of the particular communication in the circumstances under which it 
was made.”90 The right not to speak is as important as the right to speak freely and the 
Supreme Court has held that government compelled speech violates the First 
Amendment.91 The Supreme Court held a law compelling individuals to be couriers 
for ideological messages unconstitutional under the First Amendment right against 
compelled speech.92 
These free speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment extend to 
schools, as students do not “shed constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of [the 
Supreme] Court.”93 The Court held that free speech is protected on public college and 
university campuses,94 further stating that First Amendment protections on college 
campuses are necessary for the preservation of democracy:  
 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is 
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a 
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To 
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and 
universities would imperil the future of our Nation . . . Teachers and 
                                                          
 86  Id. at 34 n.74.  
 87  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 88  16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 513 (2017). 
 89  Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).  
 90  WILLIAM H. ERICKSON, ET AL., UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES AND COMMENTS: 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE ¶ 5A.03[1][a] (Matthew Bender ed. 2017). 
 91  See generally W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down 
state school requirement that all children must salute the American flag); see Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 92  Maynard, 430 U.S. at 705–06. 
 93  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 94  Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).  
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students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to 
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will 
stagnate and die.95 
 
While private colleges and universities are not constitutionally obligated to uphold 
the First Amendment rights of students, many private schools promise speech rights 
in school materials.96 Courts hold that private institutions must uphold these promises 
based on a theory of contract law.97 Furthermore, some states have codified free speech 
protections for students on private college campuses.98 For example, California’s 
“Leonard Law” prohibits private universities from punishing students for speech that 
would be protected by the First Amendment if made off-campus.99 
The connection between clear affirmative consent laws and free speech rights are 
difficult to decipher, at least in part because of the complicated relationship between 
free speech and sex in the United States. In 1957, the Supreme Court held that 
obscenity is a category of speech falling totally outside the protections of the First 
Amendment.100 The Roth Court specified, however, that “sex and obscenity are not 
synonymous.”101 While the Court eventually established the black-letter law defining 
obscenity in Miller v. California,102 several Justices expressed concern that the Court 
was “unable to . . . separate obscenity from other sexually oriented but constitutionally 
protected speech, so that efforts to suppress the former do not spill over into 
suppression of the latter.”103 
D. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: Due Process and Privacy Concerns 
The United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of “life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law,” by either the federal government 
                                                          
 95  Id. 
 96  See Fire, Private Universities, https://www.thefire.org/spotlight/public-and-private-
universities/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2019). 
 97  See Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The relevant 
terms of the contractual relationship between a student and a university typically include 
language found in the university’s student handbook . . . We interpret such contractual terms in 
accordance with the parties’ reasonable expectations, giving those terms the meaning that the 
university reasonably should expect the student to take from them.”); Corso v. Creighton Univ., 
731 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir. 1984) (“The relationship between a university and a student is 
contractual in nature.”). 
 98  See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (Deering 2017). 
 99  Id. 
 100  Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 486–87. 
 101  Id. at 487. 
 102  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 103  Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting 
that “the approach initiated 16 years ago in [Roth], and culminating in the Court’s decision 
today, cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing fundamental First 
Amendment values.”). 
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under the Fifth Amendment,104 or by state governments under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.105 The text appears to guarantee only that a person will not be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property unless he has first been provided with adequate procedures. 
Known as procedural due process, the doctrine encompasses the “conduct of legal 
proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection and 
enforcement of private rights, including notice [of the charges] and the right to a fair 
hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case.”106  
However, the Court also recognized substantive due process when laws in their 
substance infringe too deeply into individual liberty.107 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the 
Court stated that the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment included:  
 
[N]ot merely the freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the 
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, 
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, 
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.108  
 
Scholars criticize the doctrine of substantive due process as the result of activist 
judges because it is not explicitly stated in the constitutional text.109 
1. Due Process and Title IX 
The interplay of due process and the requirements of Title IX can create 
compliance complications for colleges and universities. To comply with the demands 
of Title IX, schools must provide the student complainant with a disciplinary hearing 
for the accused in response to a sexual assault allegation.110 University disciplinary 
proceedings have potentially adverse consequences for the accused student, and 
because students have both a property and liberty interest in their education, those 
disciplinary proceedings are subject to procedural due process rights for the 
accused.111 This includes a notice of the charge, as well as a hearing before an impartial 
                                                          
 104  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 105  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 106  Due Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 107  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923) (holding that a state law prohibiting 
the teaching of foreign language violated substantive due process). 
 108  Id. at 399.  
 109  Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 
408, 410–11 (2010). 
 110  2001 Guidance, supra note 75, at 14–15. “Schools have an obligation to ensure that the 
educational environment is free of discrimination and cannot fulfill this obligation without 
determining if sexual harassment complaints have merit.” Id. at 35 n.86. 
 111  Hogan, supra note 78, at 281–82. 
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tribunal.112 The Supreme Court held that even suspensions of ten days or less are 
sufficiently serious to trigger due process clause protections.113  
Due process is not a “fixed or rigid” concept, but instead is “a flexible standard 
which varies depending upon the nature of the interest affected, and the circumstances 
of the deprivation.”114 Evaluation of the process that is due in a university disciplinary 
proceeding requires application of three factors:  
 
(1) the ‘private interest’ impacted by the disciplinary proceeding; (2) ‘the 
risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest’ through the disciplinary 
proceeding and the probable value of ‘additional or substitute’ procedural 
safeguards; and (3) the school’s ‘interest; including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burden that would result from additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards.’115 
 
2. Right of Privacy as a Substantive Due Process Issue 
Substantive due process can be justified by the idea that some laws infringe so 
deeply upon protected liberties that no amount of process would be sufficient to justify 
the infringement. Although the Supreme Court most often applied substantive due 
process to protect primarily economic rights (including liberty of contract),116 in the 
1930s, the Court reversed course and took on a much less active role in scrutinizing 
the rationality of economic legislation.117 Despite this shift, the doctrine of substantive 
due process has thrived, particularly as applied to the concept of liberty and certain 
fundamental individual rights, such as those relating to family and sexual matters, the 
right to vote, the right to travel, and the right to privacy.118 The Court has held that 
activities falling within the constitutional scope of right to privacy include matters 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, and family relationships, and has 
further established that there are limitations to states’ power to “substantively regulate 
conduct.”119 
The Court determined that these fundamental individual rights should be protected 
by the most rigorous form of judicial review: strict scrutiny.120 Strict scrutiny requires 
that the government demonstrate a compelling interest, the regulation must be 
absolutely essential, and the regulation must be so “narrowly drawn to express only 
the legitimate state interests at stake.”121  
                                                          
 112  Id. at 283. 
 113  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574–75 (1975).  
 114  Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 334 (1976)). 
 115  Hogan, supra note 78, at 283 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976)). 
 116  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 67 (1905). 
 117  See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 389–90 (1937). 
 118  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 119  Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). 
 120  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973). 
 121  Id. at 155.  
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Although the Court recognized a right to privacy related to procreation and 
contraception, sexual privacy has not always been clearly protected by the 
constitutional right to privacy. In 1986, the Supreme Court found no constitutional 
protection for sexual privacy when they upheld a challenged sodomy statute.122 
However, the Court overruled that holding in Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, which 
invalidated sodomy laws in every state, thereby making it unconstitutional for states 
to criminalize same-sex consensual sexual activity.123  
III. CLEAR AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT: DANGER OF POLICING SEX AND PUNISHING 
CONSENTING ADULTS 
The United States has a history of policing sex, particularly minimizing the sexual 
autonomy of women and sexual activity among members of the same sex.124 The U.S. 
criminalized homosexual conduct for much of the nation’s history, and only received 
recognized constitutional protection in 2003.125 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court 
struck down a Texas law prohibiting sodomy between same sex partners.126 Prior to 
Lawrence, the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy, and 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause did not confer a right to 
engage in consensual sodomy, even in the private home, stating that “[t]he issue 
presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States 
that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.”127  
The Lawrence Court faced its prior precedent in Bowers head-on, stating that the 
Bowers Court “fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.”128 Lawrence 
invalidated the statute because it involved the “intimacies . . . of physical relationship,” 
and such personal choices should be free from governmental interference.129 Lawrence 
prohibits regulation or interference from the government of consensual sex.130  
A. Clear Affirmative Consent: Hypotheticals with Consenting Adults 
Strict interpretations of clear affirmative consent policies could criminalize even 
consensual encounters where both parties willingly participated but did not 
communicate that willingness at the level required by the clear affirmative consent 
standard. This violates the Court’s holding in Lawrence, as clear affirmative consent 
policies could easily be enforced against consenting adults. For example, a college 
student playfully grabbing her boyfriend’s rear end as he walks by would be 
                                                          
 122  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 123  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 124  REGULATING SEX: THE POLITICS OF INTIMACY AND IDENTITY 14–15 (Elizabeth Bernstein 
& Laurie Schaffner eds., 2005). 
 125  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 126  Id. at 560.  
 127  Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
 128  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
 129  Id. at 578. 
 130  Id. at 560. 
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considered non-consensual sexual contact, even if she has done it every day for a year, 
and even if he subjectively desired the contact, unless she asked first (or if he invited 
her to do it). Under the strictest interpretation of clear affirmative consent standards 
this would be a non-consensual sexual encounter. Even something as ubiquitous as 
running up and kissing a significant other on the lips without express permission 
would fail to meet the clear affirmative consent standard. Even if the assumption is 
made that the parties to these events had previously agreed that low-level public 
affection (even with a sexual intent) is agreeable, under strict clear affirmative consent, 
that would be insufficient to comply, because these policies typically require ongoing 
consent, and prior consent does not indicate future consent.131 
This is problematic, as it opens the door for governmental policing of sexual 
conduct. Suppose the two hypothetical incidents discussed above happened on a 
college campus and were observed by a member of the campus disciplinary 
committee. The initiating student could be subject to disciplinary action and 
punishment, even absent a complaint by the supposed “victim.” 
B. Real World Punishment of Consenting Adults 
It may seem ridiculous that a university would move forward with disciplinary 
proceedings in the face of a victim denying wrongdoing, however, for Colorado State 
University-Pueblo (“CSUP”) student Grant Neal, that is precisely what occurred.132 A 
female student in the athletic training program (only referred to anonymously as 
“complainant”) alleged that Mr. Neal raped Jane Doe (“Ms. Doe”) after noticing a 
hickey on Jane Doe’s neck.133 The complainant made the allegation to university 
officials without informing Ms. Doe or Mr. Neal.134 Both Mr. Neal and Ms. Doe 
repeatedly insisted that the sex was consensual, and in fact, Ms. Doe never reported to 
anyone, including complainant, that the sex was non-consensual.135 Ms. Doe stated, 
“he’s a good guy. He’s not a rapist, he’s not a criminal, it’s not even worth any of this 
hoopla!”136 However, the university continued with disciplinary proceedings, found 
Mr. Neal responsible for sexual misconduct, and ultimately suspended him for the 
duration of Ms. Doe’s education at CSUP.137  
The subsequent suit brought by Mr. Neal alleged the university’s violations of 
procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and sex discrimination 
under Title IX.138 He also subsequently filed suit against the federal government, 
alleging that it coerced the state to conduct the hearings in a manner that violated due 
                                                          
 131  Evan Gerstmann, The Constitutional Right to Sexual Autonomy and Affirmative Consent, 
Address at 2018 Western Political Science Association Annual Conference 7 (Loyola 
Marymount Univ., 2018). 
 132  Neal v. Colo. State Univ.-Pueblo, No. 16-cv-873-RM-CBS, 2017 WL 633045, at *1 (D. 
Colo. Feb. 16, 2017). 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id.   
 136  Id. at *2. 
 137  Id. at *4. 
 138  Id. at *5.  
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process and Title IX, and thus had further put pressure on CSUP to find males 
responsible for sexual misconduct, regardless of the available evidence.139 In July 
2017, Mr. Grant and CSUP reached an undisclosed settlement agreement.140  
Although this case did not challenge an affirmative consent standard, it illustrates 
the dangers inherent in enforcing a clear affirmative consent policy. This is 
particularly true in the context of college campuses where disciplinary hearings only 
use a clear and convincing or preponderance of the evidence standard; there are no 
safeguards in place against abusing these policies, resulting in abuses of power and 
policing sex. To partially reign in possible of abuses of power related to enforcement 
of clear affirmative consent policies, universities could institute policies requiring 
corroboration from the alleged victim in cases where a third-party reports an 
allegation. While adoption of this policy would likely decrease the ability of university 
officials to police sexual conduct (at least as related to enforcing clear affirmative 
consent standards), this policy would prove problematic in cases where an alleged 
victim has been threatened, which could result in dangerous sexual predators escaping 
punishment. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES WITH CLEAR AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT POLICIES 
As discussed above, affirmative consent does not represent a significant departure 
from rape and sexual assault law as defined in most American jurisdictions. However, 
the further requirement that affirmative consent also be clear and unambiguous does 
represent a substantial change from current law and raises constitutional concerns. 
This analysis and discussion focuses on clear, unambiguous affirmative consent 
policies (“clear affirmative consent”).  
A. First Amendment: Analytical Challenges with Clear Affirmative Consent 
The task of analyzing clear affirmative consent policies in the context of free 
speech is inexact, because this type of policy does not fit neatly into any of the 
previously litigated classifications of speech regulations. Sexual communication and 
sexual encounters can be inherently awkward and imprecise. Clear affirmative consent 
policies do not prohibit speech or compel speech in the traditional First Amendment 
sense.141 Instead, the government has waded into this sphere requiring individuals to 
meet an ill-defined, but exacting level of precision, within sexual communication, or 
risk facing severe punishment.  
There is no precedent regarding this type of government regulation because 
requiring a particular level of precision in speech is not typical. Although an unusual 
way to regulate speech, clear affirmative consent standards limit free expression in 
                                                          
 139  Id. at *6.  
 140  Kayla Schiebecker, Athlete Accused of Rape by Colorado State – Not His Sex Partner – 
Is Getting Paid to Drop Lawsuit, COLLEGE FIX (July 19, 2017), 
https://www.thecollegefix.com/athlete-accused-rape-colorado-state-not-sex-partner-getting-
paid-drop-lawsuit/. On July 14, 2017, a joint status report was filed with the court, indicating 
that Mr. Grant and CSU-Pueblo were nearing a settlement agreement including both monetary 
and non-monetary terms. The Federal defendants in the case were not part of settlement 
discussions with the Plaintiff. 
 141  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also William M. Howard, 
Constitutional Challenges to Compelled Speech – Particular Situations or Circumstances, 73 
A.L.R. 6th 281, 281 (2012). 
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violation of the First Amendment. The requirement of consent in sexual encounters is 
a substantive requirement of law and is clearly constitutionally permissible, however, 
the further requirement of clear, unambiguous consent (particularly when that is not 
clearly defined) raises First Amendment concerns. 142 
1. Overbreadth as a Constitutional Concern 
From a First Amendment perspective, this Note does not argue that the First 
Amendment rights of a would-be rapist would be infringed. In cases where one party 
alleges that the encounter was non-consensual, no First Amendment concern is raised 
because violence is not protected speech.143 Therefore, any consent law as applied to 
the free speech rights of an attacker would likely be upheld. However, under strict 
interpretations of clear affirmative consent policies, the rights of law-abiding citizens 
are violated. These policies are unconstitutionally overbroad because they reach 
protected speech—sexual encounters that both parties subjectively agree were 
consensual.144  
Regulations of any speech, whether protected or unprotected, must not be overly 
broad or so vague that the average citizen cannot understand what is allowed or 
prohibited.145 Overly broad speech regulates substantially more speech than is 
permissible under the First Amendment.146 For example, a law banning all 
photographs containing nudity is overly broad.147 The Court held that pornography 
may be regulated if it is obscene,148 but other expression must be allowed to contain 
nudity, like art.149 Here, strict clear affirmative consent laws are unnecessarily broad 
in that they purport to regulate all sexual activity, including that which is mutually 
desired, but still violates the clear affirmative consent policy.150  
Statutes may be challenged as “facially” invalid, “because of a judicial prediction 
or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court 
                                                          
 142  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
 143  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (“The First Amendment 
does not protect violence.”). 
 144  See discussion supra Part III-A.  
 145  Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982). 
 146  See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 648, 652 (E.D. Pa. 
2004) (holding that overbreadth doctrine did not apply, because child-pornography law was not 
facially challenged, but was unconstitutional under the First Amendment because 
implementation of the statute resulted in blocking significant amounts of constitutionally 
protected speech). Here, clear affirmative consent policies are facially overbroad, as they 
purport to regulate all sexual conduct, even between two willing, consenting adults. 
 147  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 28 (1973). 
 148  Id. at 23–24 (“This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene 
material is unprotected by the First Amendment . . . As a result, we now confine the permissible 
scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct . . . A state offense 
must also be limited to works which . . . portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and 
which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 149  Id. at 26. 
 150  See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 649. 
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to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.”151 An overbroad law 
is often too vague for a reasonable person to understand what behavior is prohibited 
and what behavior is not. To avoid breaking an overbroad law, many people will 
voluntarily choose not to engage in behavior protected by the First Amendment or 
another basic right just to be sure they are not accidentally breaking the overbroad law. 
Since these laws either infringe on basic rights or encourage people to avoid exercising 
basic rights, most courts recognize that anyone who is affected by an overbroad law 
has standing to challenge the law’s overbreadth on behalf of all persons affected by 
that law.152  
B. Violation of the First Amendment’s Right to Free Speech 
A clear affirmative consent standard violates the First Amendment rights of free 
speech of consenting adults. While the First Amendment's language at first appears to 
be unambiguous and absolute, the Supreme Court has not regarded the text as absolute 
and has categorically denied free speech protections for certain kinds of speech: 
obscenity, true threats, fighting words, perjury, blackmail, incitement to imminent 
lawless action, solicitation to commit crimes, defamation, and plagiarism of 
copyrighted material.153 Justice Holmes understood that free speech is not absolute 
when he wrote, “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man 
in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic,”154 and the government may 
take action to prevent or punish such speech.155 
It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court held that freedom of speech 
guaranteed by the First Amendment was protected from impairment not only from the 
national government, but from state governments, as protected under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.156 The Fourteenth Amendment states, in 
relevant part “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”157 
1. Sexual Communication as Protected Speech 
To challenge a law regulating speech, one must first determine what constitutes 
protected speech.158 Sexual communication between two consenting adults is pure 
speech.159 An ignoble theme of First Amendment law is that, when faced with difficult 
speech questions, the Supreme Court often avoids the issue by determining that the 
                                                          
 151  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
 152  Id. 
 153  16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 953 (2017). 
 154  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 155  Id.  
 156  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 157  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
 158  Act Now to Stop War and End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 905 F. Supp. 2d 
317, 328 (2012). 
 159  Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969). 
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law at issue regulates conduct rather than speech.160 Because clear affirmative consent 
standards purport to regulate the procurement of consent, it is possible that courts 
would attempt to avoid the First Amendment question altogether by stating that this is 
conduct rather than speech. However, conduct that is considered expressive is 
accorded First Amendment protections as symbolic speech.161 The communication of 
participants in a sexual encounter may be comprised exclusively of conduct. If courts 
are hesitant to define sexual communication as pure speech in and of itself, courts 
must determine if that conduct is expressive.  
Whether conduct has an expressive element is determined by a two-part test.162 
Conduct is deemed expressive if (1) the actor intended to express a particularized 
message and (2) that message is understood by the audience.163 Here, the act of 
seduction or request for consent indicates a particularized message or idea and is able 
to be understood by the audience: “I am interested in sexual contact with you.” Further, 
the act of the consenting party is also expressive conduct that is understood by the 
audience: “sex is welcome.” The two-part test to determine expressive conduct sets a 
low bar and recognizes that a wide-range of conduct can be considered expressive.164 
Treating sexual conduct as expressive satisfies the two-part test and is consistent with 
the First Amendment’s purpose. At its most basic level, sexual communication is 
protected speech, whether verbal or non-verbal. The government should not compel 
enthusiastic response to a request for a sexual encounter in order that the encounter 
not be criminalized.  
In Bowers, the Supreme Court upheld a statute criminalizing sodomy against a due 
process claim, finding that the statute was rationally related to the state’s interest in 
protecting morality.165 Although not decided on free speech grounds, the Court’s 
rationale for allowing the state to regulate sodomy (upholding notions of morality) 
indicates that sexual activity is inherently communicative: “upholding community 
morals—is inextricably related to what sodomy expresses to the community . . . 
Because homosexual conduct between consenting adults can have no effect on society 
other than by virtue of what it communicates, its regulation should trigger searching 
examination by a reviewing court.”166 Although the argument was raised that sodomy 
within the privacy of the home should be protected based on Stanley v. Georgia—
holding that the First Amendment prohibited conviction for possession of obscene 
material within the privacy of the home—the Bowers Court rejected this argument.167 
                                                          
 160  See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). 
 161  16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 922 (2017).  
 162  Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (holding that the display of a flag with 
a peace symbol affixed to it was constitutionally protected speech, and statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to defendant). 
 163  Id. at 414–15.  
 164  David D. Cole, From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of 
Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319, 323–24 (1994). 
 165  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, (2003).  
 166  Cole, supra note 164, at 323. 
 167  Bowers, supra note 165, at 195. 
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The Court stated that the holding of Stanley was based firmly on First Amendment 
rights, rather than Fourteenth Amendment due process.168  
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court overruled Bowers.169 While not decided on First 
Amendment grounds, the Court expressed that states should not: 
 
[D]efine the meaning of the [personal] relationship or to set its boundaries 
absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It 
suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this 
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and 
still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt 
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but 
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.170 
 
Nude dancing has also been considered “expressive conduct” by eight Supreme 
Court Justices.171 In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia defined “inherently 
expressive conduct” as conduct “that is normally engaged in for the purpose of 
communicating an idea, or perhaps an emotion, to someone else.”172 Sex clearly meets 
this definition of inherently expressive conduct. Sex between two persons is inherently 
communicative at its core, and may express any number of emotions: love, desire, or 
even anger.173 No matter the degree—kissing, holding hands, or intercourse—sex is 
inherently communicative and expressive, and should be considered protected speech 
for the purposes of First Amendment protection. 
2. Compelled Speech 
Free speech violations can be broadly grouped into two categories: (1) compelled 
speech and (2) restricted speech. One of the most fundamental tenants in free speech 
jurisprudence is that the right not to speak is protected as fiercely as the right to 
speak.174 One of the problems with the government essentially requiring a script for 
sex is that it appears, at first glance, like government compelled speech. However, 
clear affirmative consent standards would likely not fall within the compelled speech 
doctrine as historically defined because it does not require communication of an 
ideological message.  
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court struck 
down a state law requiring school children to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of 
                                                          
 168  Id. 
 169  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 170  Id. at 566–67. 
 171  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991).  
 172  Id. at 578 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 173  Cole, supra note 164, at 326 (“Indeed, the communicative power of sex is often 
unmatched by other forms of communication. To say, ‘I love you’ is one thing; to hold a lover’s 
hand in public to express one’s love can express something quite different; and ‘to make love’ 
is often a still more profound expression of what one feels and thinks.”). 
 174  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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Allegiance.175 Jehovah’s Witnesses, who refused to salute the flag, challenged the law 
citing religious grounds. Their children were “expelled from school and . . . threatened 
with exclusion for no other cause.”176 Justice Jackson wrote what is perhaps the most 
often cited passage in First Amendment case law, stating that if “there is any fixed star 
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion.”177 
Not all government compelled speech is problematic. For example, the 
government compels all citizens to report income each year for income taxes and the 
government restricts commercial speech in various ways.178 Courts have typically only 
prohibited government compelled speech when the speech communicates an officially 
mandated ideology.179 In 1977, the Supreme Court again struck down a law 
compelling government speech when a New Hampshire couple was prosecuted three 
times for covering up the motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plate.180 The 
couple, also Jehovah’s Witnesses, objected to the motto on religious grounds.181 Chief 
Justice Burger stated that the law prohibiting obscuring or defacing license plates 
could not be enforced against the couple because the law compelled individuals to be 
“couriers for ideological messages” and “mobile billboards.”182 The Court found a 
“freedom of mind” that protects individuals from government coercion to 
communicate an officially mandated ideology.183 
To argue that clear affirmative consent standards offend the compelled speech 
doctrine as historically interpreted would require a considerable expansion of the 
doctrine, as there is no ideology communicated in clear affirmative consent. As such, 
even the strictest interpretations of clear affirmative consent standards are unlikely to 
meet the current criteria to be considered compelled speech. However, as previously 
discussed, the regulation at issue charges individuals with inspiring or compelling 
speech from another, with the further requirement that the inspired speech be clear and 
unambiguous to avoid punishment. This atypical regulatory scheme may warrant a 
closer look at, and potential expansion of, the compelled speech doctrine.  
3. Restricting Speech 
The Supreme Court has had a complicated relationship with restrictions on 
sexually explicit speech. While obscenity is not protected speech under the First 
                                                          
 175  Id. at 629.  
 176  Id. at 630. 
 177  Id. at 642.  
 178  Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 
509 U.S. 418, 436 (1993); Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601, 620 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 179  Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,713 (1977).  
 180  Id. at 708.  
 181  Id. 
 182  Id. at 715.  
 183  Id. at 714–15.  
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Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that not all sexual speech is obscene.184 In 
Roth, the Court stated:  
 
Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which 
deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest . . . Sex, a great 
mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of 
absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital 
problems of human interest and public concern.185 
 
The Supreme Court has generally struck down prohibitions on non-obscene nudity 
and erotic expressive conduct, but in 1991, the Court upheld a ban on nude dancing, 
reasoning that it was part of a general prohibition of public nudity.186 Although nude 
dancing has been considered expressive conduct, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that 
the statute did not run afoul of the Constitution because the law was not aimed at the 
erotic message, but rather at the perceived evil of public nudity, generally.187 
It is well-settled that “a law imposing criminal penalties on protected speech is a 
stark example of speech suppression.”188 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the 
Court invalidated a federal law banning virtual child pornography (pornography which 
appears to, but does not actually, depict children) as overbroad, and thus violating the 
First Amendment because the speech ban was not narrowly drawn.189 The Court 
reasoned that the statute went “well beyond” an interest in prohibiting only illegal 
conduct by “restricting speech available to law-abiding adults.”190  
4. Level of Scrutiny 
Typically, in First Amendment cases, strict scrutiny is applied to laws that regulate 
speech if the regulation is content-based. Strict scrutiny requires that the government 
must have a compelling interest and the regulation must be absolutely essential and 
narrowly tailored to achieve that end.191 Although the government has a compelling 
interest in the prevention of rape and sexual assault, “[a]mong free men, the deterrents 
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations 
                                                          
 184  Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (citations omitted). 
 185  Id. The Court went on to define “prurient interest” as “material having a tendency to 
excite lustful thoughts.” Id. at 487 n.20. 
 186  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571 (1991). 
 187  Id. 
 188  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). 
 189  Id. at 252–53. 
 190  Id. The Court stated that because actual children were not harmed or exploited in creating 
the virtual child pornography, the central rationale behind making child pornography a category 
of wholly unprotected speech (creation of the speech is itself the crime of child abuse) did not 
apply to the virtual depictions. Id. at 254–55. 
 191  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). 
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of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech.”192 Merely the prospect of crime 
“by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech.”193   
Strict clear affirmative consent standards go well beyond a government interest in 
preventing crime and intrude into constitutionally prohibited territory by compelling 
a particularly demanding level of precision in sexual communication. This, in turn, 
constrains the speech of even consenting adults. If the Court applied strict scrutiny to 
a First Amendment challenge of clear affirmative consent laws, the government is 
very unlikely to succeed.  
However, clear affirmative consent policies are not so easy to classify as content-
based or content-neutral. Content-based restrictions are enacted for the purpose of 
restraining speech on the basis of its content, and presumptively violate the First 
Amendment.194 Conversely, content-neutral restrictions (time, place, and manner 
restrictions) are subject to intermediate scrutiny and do not violate the First 
Amendment “so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest 
and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.”195 In Renton, 
the Court considered a zoning law regulating the location of adult theatres and stated 
that the ordinance did not, at first glance: 
 
[A]ppear to fit neatly into either the ‘content-based’ or the ‘content-neutral’ 
category. To be sure, the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult 
films differently from other kinds of theaters. Nevertheless . . . the Renton 
ordinance is aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult motion 
picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the 
surrounding community.196 
 
If challenged on free speech grounds, the government is likely to argue that clear 
affirmative consent is not meant to regulate the content of the speech, except to ensure 
that the consent law’s substantive requirement of consent is met. In other words, clear 
affirmative consent is concerned with regulating a secondary effect (sexual assault) 
rather than regulating the content of individuals’ sexual communications. The Court 
in Renton eventually held that zoning ordinances designed to combat objectionable 
secondary effects should be considered content-neutral, “at least with respect to 
businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials,” and therefore, subject to 
intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny.197  
While intermediate scrutiny is a less exacting standard than strict scrutiny, it 
provides a more in-depth inquiry than the rational basis test. The government would 
easily meet the first prong of the test, as preventing sexual assault is a substantial 
government interest.198 However, the second prong is more difficult to meet. Clear 
                                                          
 192  Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) 
(citation omitted). 
 193  Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 245. 
 194  Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986).  
 195  Id. at 47. 
 196  Id. 
 197  Id. at 49.  
 198  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 583 (1991). 
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affirmative consent polices cannot be said to leave open reasonable alternatives for 
communication. Because these policies require such an exacting level of precision, 
even intermediate scrutiny will be a difficult hurdle to clear. It is important to note that 
affirmative consent policies without the further requirement of clear and unambiguous 
consent are more likely to survive intermediate scrutiny, as those policies allow for 
significant freedom in sexual communication, while still protecting the consent 
requirement.  
C. Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Right to Privacy 
In addition to First Amendment free speech and overbreadth concerns, clear 
affirmative consent policies also raise substantive due process concerns. Under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, statutes that punish an individual for something 
not clearly defined runs afoul of substantive due process and can be struck down as 
unconstitutionally vague.199  
1. Vagueness as a Constitutional Concern 
Laws are considered void for vagueness if it would be impossible for a reasonable 
person to determine what speech or conduct is sufficient and/or necessary to be in 
compliance with the law.200 The Court has held that a statute forbidding or requiring 
an act must not be so vague that “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning and differ as to its application.”201 Unconstitutional vagueness extends 
the vagueness doctrine to the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, with courts holding that vague criminal laws deprive citizens of rights 
without fair process, and such laws are thus, unconstitutional.202 In 1971, the Florida 
Supreme Court struck down the state’s sodomy law as “unconstitutional for vagueness 
and uncertainty in its language,” holding that a reasonable person could not know for 
certain whether the statute prohibited oral sex (or if it was restricted to only anal 
penetration) as an “abominable and detestable crime against nature.”203 
Unfortunately, clear affirmative consent statutes, though aiming to clarify consent 
rules, have instead muddied the waters and made it less clear what speech or conduct 
is required to avoid violation of the policy. Although courts have typically applied the 
unconstitutional vagueness test to criminal statutes for violation of due process, it 
would likely be applicable even in non-criminal statutes governing university policies 
because the Supreme Court has recognized, though never explicitly held, that 
university students have property and liberty rights in their education that are protected 
                                                          
 199  Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1261–62 (2016) (noting that the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is “a doctrine that is mandated by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment (with respect to the federal government) and the Fourteenth Amendment (with 
respect to the States).”) (citing Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015)). 
 200  Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926) (holding that a statute imposing 
severe punishments on State contractors paying employees less than the “current rate of per 
diem wages in the locality where the work is performed,” was void for vagueness and 
uncertainty, presenting a “double uncertainty, fatal to its validity as a criminal statute”). 
 201  Id. at 391. 
 202  Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1971). 
 203  Id. 
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by the Constitution.204 In 1975, the Court considered due process rights of students at 
the elementary and secondary levels, holding that a suspension without a hearing 
violated due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.205 Lower courts have 
expanded Goss, holding that university students have a liberty and property interest in 
their education, and attempts to deprive students of those interests—through 
suspension or expulsion—must comport with due process.206 
Because students’ education rights are protected under due process, the 
unconstitutional vagueness doctrine would apply to both criminal clear affirmative 
consent statutes and statutes governing university sexual assault policies.207 
Particularly with sexual communication, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
what clear or unambiguous consent looks like at the margins, particularly when many 
statutes require continuous consent.  
Clearly, asking for verbal consent, “may I kiss you?” and receiving a verbal “yes” 
would constitute clear affirmative consent for kissing. But, as the sexual encounter 
escalates, clear consent must be continually obtained. While some activity can be 
clearly distinguished from another activity (for instance, consent obtained for kissing 
is not sufficient to be considered consent for intercourse), lines cannot be drawn so 
clearly for many of the varying degrees of sexual activity. For example, if consent has 
been obtained for kissing, must separate consent also be obtained to wrap arms around 
a partner? If consent has been granted to remove clothing, must consent also be 
obtained to now touch the exposed skin? Once a particular sexual activity has 
commenced, how often must consent be renewed to remain in compliance with 
continuous consent requirements? Answers to these questions are elusive and amount 
to speculation at best. Therefore, many of these policies would be unconstitutionally 
vague and unenforceable.  
2. Dangers of Clear Affirmative Consent as the Criminal Standard 
Even in the criminal arena, there has been significant pushback from the legal 
community in response to proposed changes to the Model Penal Code’s (“MPC”) 
definition of affirmative consent.208 In May 2016, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) 
rejected a definition of consent for the MPC that would move it closer to affirmative 
                                                          
 204  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975). 
 205  Id. at 574 (“Among other things, the State is constrained to recognize a student’s 
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is protected by the Due 
Process Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the 
minimum procedures required by that Clause.”). 
 206  See, e.g., Albert v. Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333, 1339 n.6 (2d Cir. 1987) (“A preliminary 
question here would be whether the appellants have been deprived of any constitutionally 
protected rights by their suspension. Although the students’ complaint does not specify which 
rights they claim to have been deprived of, we note that, at a minimum, the students’ protected 
liberty interest is at stake because of the ‘stigma’ attached to suspension from college for 
disciplinary reasons.”) (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 574–76). 
 207  Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 526 F. App’x 537, 547 n.4 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 208  Jennifer Morinigo, The Evolution of the Model Penal Code “Consent” Definition, ALI 
ADVISER (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.thealiadviser.org/sexual-assault/evolution-of-model-
penal-code-consent-definition/. 
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consent.209 In 2014 and 2015, the ALI Annual Meeting drafts for proposed changes 
were the same, and included the following definition of “consent” in section 213.0(3): 
“‘Consent’ means a person’s positive agreement, communicated by either words or 
actions, to engage in sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”210 This definition was hotly 
debated at the 2015 Annual Meeting, with critics arguing that, as written, the definition 
adopted an affirmative consent standard and “strayed too far from existing cultural 
norms.”211 As a result, the committee returned to the 2016 Annual Meeting with a new, 
more convoluted definition:  
 
(a) “Consent” means a person’s behavior, including words and 
conduct— both action and inaction—that communicates the person’s 
willingness to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration or sexual 
contact . . .  
 
(c) Consent may be express, or it may be inferred from a person’s behavior. 
Neither verbal nor physical resistance is required to establish the absence 
of consent; the person’s behavior must be assessed in the context of all the 
circumstances to determine whether the person has consented. 
 
(d) Consent may be revoked any time before or during the act of 
sexual penetration or sexual contact, by behavior communicating that the 
person is no longer willing. A clear verbal refusal—such as “No,” “Stop,” 
or “Don’t”—suffices to establish the lack of consent. A clear verbal refusal 
also suffices to withdraw previously communicated willingness in the 
absence of subsequent behavior that communicates willingness before the 
sexual act occurs.212 
 
One hundred and twenty members signed a letter to ALI, urging members to vote 
no, voicing concerns about due process and burden-shifting caused by the proposed 
definition, as well as the dangers of criminalization of consensual sexual activity. The 
ALI members wrote:  
 
The prosecutor need only say, ‘Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, under 
the State’s definition, it does not matter whether the complainant actually 
was willing. It is undisputed that the sex act occurred and there is no 
evidence in the record that the complainant communicated willingness. 
There is no consent if the complainant has not communicated willingness. 
                                                          
 209  Bradford Richardson, American Law Institute rejects affirmative consent standard in 
defining sexual assault, WASH. TIMES (May 17, 2016), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/may/17/american-law-institute-rejects-
affirmative-consent/.  
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29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019
460 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:431 
You must convict if you find that the defendant recklessly disregarded that 
absence of consent.213 
3. Constitutional Right to Privacy 
Currently, the constitutional right to privacy is held to reside in due process. 
However, the Supreme Court previously recognized a “penumbra” of right to privacy 
in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, including in the First Amendment.214 The Court 
struck down a Connecticut law prohibiting the sale, possession, and distribution of 
contraception to married couples holding that it was unnecessarily broad, and thus 
unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of marital privacy.215 The Court offered 
multiple justifications for this decision, ranging from Justice Douglas’s penumbra 
theory, stating that without “peripheral rights,” other constitutional rights would be 
“less secure,”216 to Justice Goldberg’s interpretation that the Ninth Amendment 
provides justification for protecting privacy,217 to Justice Harlan’s argument that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty clause proscribed this kind of far-reaching state 
action.218 
In 1972, the Court extended the right to privacy to even unmarried individuals by 
invalidating a law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons.219 
The Court found the law to be in conflict with fundamental human rights and stated, 
“[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”220  
The Supreme Court even concluded, in a unanimous decision, that the right to 
privacy protects an individual’s right to possess and view otherwise unprotected 
obscenity in his own home.221 Justice Marshall relied on both the First and Fourth 
Amendments to conclude that no matter the justifications for obscenity laws, those 
justifications do not reach into the sanctity of the home.222 “If the First Amendment 
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in 
his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole 
                                                          
 213  Over 110 ALI Members Express Concerns About Sexual Assault Project, 
CRIMPROFBLOG (Apr. 18, 2016), 
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constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control 
men’s minds.”223  
Over time, the Court has moved away from the “penumbra” theory of right to 
privacy, shifting in favor of a constitutional right to privacy residing in the liberty 
guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments under substantive due process.224 
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the “right of privacy . . . founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action” is a 
fundamental right and any state regulation must therefore be subjected to strict 
scrutiny.225 In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy stated: 
 
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State 
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their 
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process 
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the government. ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that 
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.’226 
 
The clear affirmative consent standard regulates not just speech between persons 
prior to sexual encounters, but throughout one of the most intimate experiences in 
human existence. Clear affirmative consent standards intrude into the most private 
portion of the home, the bedroom—and indeed—the bed itself. These policies clearly 
violate the constitutional right to privacy between two consenting adults.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Affirmative consent has garnered both support and opposition. Both proponents 
and critics, though, tend to confuse the issues and misunderstand what an affirmative 
consent policy does—or does not do—as well as falsely equate affirmative consent as 
a substantive standard versus an adjudicative standard. Affirmative consent, generally, 
does not represent a substantial modification of currently existing rape and sexual 
assault law in most jurisdictions. However, policies that further require that 
affirmative consent be clear or unambiguous do represent a considerable change. 
As substantive policies, affirmative consent policies are positive and encourage 
people to not only communicate prior to engaging in sexual encounters, but to check 
for understanding. They also decrease the possibility of error or confusion, thus 
ensuring a more positive sexual experience for all involved. Teaching young people 
that affirmative consent is the only appropriate benchmark for initiating sexual activity 
is important and may well be transformative.  
However, as an adjudicative standard, clear affirmative consent policies do not 
resolve—or even simplify—the difficulties currently faced in university sexual assault 
disciplinary hearings: determining what happened and then deciding if what happened 
amounts to proper consent. Further, clear affirmative consent standards, as currently 
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written and implemented, increase the dangers of policing sex, are overbroad, violate 
the constitutional guarantee of free speech and the privacy rights of consenting adults, 
and are unconstitutionally vague. These policies violate essential rights and freedoms 
and do not solve the problems inherent with current interpretations of consent law. 
Rape and sexual assault continue to be significant, growing problems on college 
campuses and efforts to prevent and punish these kinds of incidents should be 
applauded. Those efforts should not, however, trample liberty in the process.  
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